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CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER EXCHANGE
ACT RULE 10B-5 FOR
MISAPPROPRIATORS OF NONPUBLIC
INFORMATION: AN ARGUMENT FOR
CONSISTENCY
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is the cornerstone of the
federal government's efforts to regulate the securities markets; Rule
10b-5 lies at the heart of the federal regulatory framework. 1 The broad
language of Rule 101)-5 and the underlying statute are designed to
catch a wide variety of fraudulent. schemes that wreak havoc on secu-
rities markets. 2 The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
enforces these provisions. 3
Traditionally, the SEC has used Rule 10b-5 to combat insider
trading.' Typically, an insider is a corporate official who obtains mate-
rial, nonpublic information about the corporation in the course of
employment:' An insider obtains confidential information about the
corporation as a result of the insider's position of trust within the
corporation." This gives rise to a fiduciary duty to the corporation's
shareholders under state law, apart. from the duties imposed by federal
securities law.7 Rule 1011-5 prohibits an insider from trading in the
corporation's securities based on material, nonpublic information be-
cause such trading is a fraudulent breach of the insider's duty to the
corporation's shareholders. 8
The misappropriation theory expands Rule . 10b-5 to prohibit con-
duct that does not fall within the traditional conception of insider
trading.`'' The misappropriation theory applies when a person other
1 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.101)-5 (1997); CliiareIla v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 248 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Ti heir purpose is to ensure the fair and honest functioning of ...
markets where common-law protections have proved inadequate."). The Securities Exchange Act
is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et sap (1994).
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); Chiare[ta, 495 U.S. at 246 (Illacktminj., dissenting); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1011-5 (1997).
s See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1994).
4 See, e.g.., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 407 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1901),
See United States v. O'llagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-53 (1997) (differentiating between "clas-
sical" insider trading and misappropriation theory).
(.1 See Id. at 652,
7 See id.
8 See id.
See id. at 652-53.
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than a corporate insider obtains material, nonpublic information
about a corporation from a source to which that person owes a fidu-
ciary duty. 1 ° Under the theory, that person takes the nonpublic infor-
mation and "misappropriates" it for his or her own use by engaging in
a securities transaction." Thus, like a traditional insider, the misappro-
priator's actions produce unfair, risk-free profits and thereby cause the
harms that securities laws aim to prevent.' 2
Since its inception, the misappropriation theory has aroused con-
siderable controversy.' 3 In 1997, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the misappropriation theory in the criminal
context." The policies driving securities regulation in general, and
Rule 10b-5 in particular, militate in favor of the misappropriation
theory's adoption in civil cases as well.''
This Note will first survey the origin and development of the
misappropriation theory in the criminal context.' 6 Second, this Note
will provide a detailed analysis of United States v. O'Hagan, the case
that settled the controversy surrounding the misappropriation theory.' 7
Third, this Note will explore the policy underpinnings of civil suits
under Rule 10b-5. 18 Lastly, it will argue that application of the misap-
propriation theory in civil actions would further these policy goals.°
I. TIIE ROAD TO O'HA CAN: DEVELOPMENT OF THE
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides, in
relevant part: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
. . . to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations [that the SEC may pro-
vide] ."2" Acting pursuant to this grant of rulemaking authority, the SEC
promulgated Rule 101)-5. 2 ' The Rule provides, in relevant part: "It shall
10 See °Hagan, 521 U.S. :u 652.
"See id.
-
12 See id. at 659.
/3 See David CoWIlli Bayne, Sj., Insider Theory: The Demise of the Misappropriation Theory—and
Thereafter, 41 Sr. Louts U. Lj. 625, 637 (1997) (arguing against misappropriation theory's
viilidity); Lawrence A. Rosenbloom, Is it Inside or Out r-A Proposal to Clarify the Misappropriation
Theory of Unlawful Trading, 18 CARD0ZO U. REV. 867 (1997) (arguing in favor of theory's
11 See 011agatt, 521 U.S. at 650.
15 See id. at 659; Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Stipp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
16 See infra notes 20-1 l 1 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 112-51 and accompanying text.
113 See infra notes 152-88 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 189-231 and accompanying text.
2" l5 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
21 See 17 C.F.R. 9 240,101)-5.
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be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . . to employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . [or] ... to engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." 22 Section 10(h) speaks of "deception," whereas
Rule 1013-5 speaks of "II-aIA."23 The distinction may seem meaningless,
because deception is a necessary element of a fraudulent act. 21 Never-
theless, many courts focus on the language of section 10(b), rather
than the language of Rule 101)-5. 25
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court decided Chiarella v.'
United Slates, a landmark case construing Rule 1013-5 in the criminal
context:26 The Court held that Rule 101)-5 does not create a general
duty requiring investors to disclose material, nonpublic information
before trading. 27 Such a duty, the Court reasoned, arises only where
the party in possession of the information has a duty to disclose.28
Because the Court determined that the misappropriation theory was
not presented to the jury, it declined to rule on the theory's validity. 2"
The defendant, Vincent Chiarella, worked for Pandick Press, a
financial printer." Among other things, Panclick Press printed corpo-
rate takeover bids.'l The names of the acquiring company and target
company were omitted from the documents supplied to the printer. 32
The companies' names were supplied at the last minute." In five
instances, however, Mr. Chiarella used the other information in the
documents to deduce which companies were involved.'" Armed with
this information, he purchased stock in the target corporations." Mr.
22 Id.
23 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. 4 240.10b-5.
21 See RESTATENtENT (SECOND) OF 'TORTS § 526 (1066). I have not seen any court or commen-
tator offer an example (actual or hypothetical) where Rule 100-5 would reach activity that was
not "deceptive" within the meaning of section 10(b).
2'
	
e.g., United States v. O'llagan, 92 F.3d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1996), reri'd, 521 U.S. 642
(1997). In this Note, the requirements of fraud and deception are treated interchangeably, unless
indicated otherwise.
21 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
27 See id. at 233. .
28 See id. at 230 ("Such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising From a relationship
of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.").
29 See id. at 236.
3() See id. at 224.
31 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
32 See id.
33 See id.
3.1 See id.
See id.
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Chiarella later was indicted for violations of Rule 1 Ob-5. 36 At trial, the
judge instructed the jury to convict Mr. Chiarella if it determined that
he traded on material information when "he knew other people trad-
ing in the securities market did not have access to the same informa-
tion."37 The jury returned convictions on all counts, which the Second
Circuit ultimately affirmed. 38
The Supreme Court overturned Mr. Chiarella's convictions)"' The
Court asserted that a person has no duty to refrain from trading in
securities solely because that person possesses material, nonpublic
information relating to those securities. 4 '} The Court noted that there is
no legislative history suggesting that Congress intended such a sweep-
ing effect when it enacted section 10(b):" The Court also stated that
some of the SEC's own regulations recognized that investors had no
general duty to disclose material, nonpublic information before trad-
i ng.42
• Having concluded that Rule 10b-5 does not create a general duty
to disclose nonpublic information, the Court reasoned that Mr. Chia-
rella did not violate Ride 10b-5 unless he violated a duty existing apart
from federal securities law that made his failure to disclose fraudu-
lent. 43 Ostensibly, there were two parties to whom Mr. Chiarella could
have owed such a duty: ( 1) the sellers of the stock; and (2) the acquir-
ing company, from which Mr. Chiarella had converted the nonpublic
information:"
The Court rejected the notion that Mr. Chiarella owed a duty to
the sellers of the stock.''' The Court distinguished Mr. Chiarella from
a traditional "insider," who obtains material, nonpublic information
about a corporation through the insider's position of trust within that
corporation."" In such cases, the insider owes a fiduciary duty to the
corporation's shareholders:17 Therefore, the insider's failure to disclose
36 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224. The case provides no information about the circumstances
that led to the discovery of Nit. Chiarella's alleged fraud. See id.
37 See id. at 231 (quoting the judge's instructions to the jury).
38 See id. at 225.
39
 See id.
49 See id. at 233.
41 See. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
42 See id. at 234.
43 See Id. at 232.
44 See id. at 232, 235-36.
45 See id. at 232.
46 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 ("[Nir. Chiarella] was not a fiduciary . . . in whom the sellers
had placed their trust and confidence.").
47 See id. at 230 ( -Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate
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material, nonpublic information when trading in the corporation's
stock is fraudulent and falls within the ambit of Rule I Ob-5. 48 Mr.
Chiarella, however, had no relationship with the target corporation. 49
Therefore, the Court concluded that he had no fiduciary duty to the
corporation's shareliolders."
The Court declined to decide whether Mr. Chiarella could be
culpable under Rule 101)-5 for breaching his duty to the acquiring
corporation by "misappropriating" its nonpublic information for his
own use.'' There was no question that Mr. Chiarella breached a duty
to his employer when he used information obtained in the course of
his employment for his own personal trading purposes. 52 Nevertheless,
the Court determined that the jury instructions did not require Mr.
Chiarella to have violated any duty for him to have been guilty of
violating Rule 101)-5P Thus, the Court ruled that the misappropriation
theory was not at issue.' } By so deciding, the Court missed an early
opportunity to settle the ambiguity surrounding the misappropriation
theory."
In his influential dissenting opinion in Chiarella, Chief Justice
Burger argued that the misappropriation theory was properly charged
in the case and that it was an acceptable basis for criminal liability
under Rule 10b-5.r'6 The Chief justice agreed with the majority's asser-
tion that there is no general duty to disclose material, nonpublic
information before trading. 57 He explained that this lack of duty re-
insiders ...vill not benefit personally through frandulem use of material, nonpublic informa-
tion.").
48 See id.
4• Sec id. at 232-33.
• " See id.
51 See Chiaretta, 445 U.S. at 236. Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion to
underscore the fact that no judgment had been made on the misappropriation theory's validity,
and the Coun's reversal of Mr. Chiarella's convictions did not necessarily mean that his actions
were lawful. See id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
• 2 See id. at 235-36.
113 See id. at 231 ("In effect, the trial court instructed the jury that petitioner (wed a duty to
everyone: to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole.").
54 See id. at 236.
55 See, e.g., United Stales V. Bryan, 58 F.51.1 933, 949 Ora Cir. 1995) (rejecting the misappro-
priation theory); United States v. Carpenter, 791 E2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cin 1986) (adopting the
misappropriation theory), affd by an evenly divided can vi 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).
See 445 U.S. at 239 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). The Chief Justice's arguments that the
misappropriation theory was properly charged in the jury instructions are not relevant to this
Note; thus, the discussion will focus on the Chief Justice's arguments in favor of the misappro-
priation theory's validity.
57 See id. at 239-40. ("As a general rule, neither party to air arm's•length business transaction
has an obligation to disclose information to the other unless the parties stand in some confidential
or fiduciary relation.").
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flects a policy in favor of encouraging investors to gather and analyze
as much relevant information as possible." By allowing investors that
do not act deviously to use informational advantages to reap profits,
the law rewards those who are skilled in the art of gathering and
analyzing market information?)
Having defined his view of the policy underlying the lack of a
general "disclose or abstain" rule, the Chief justice argued that courts
should use the Rule's policy underpinnings to define the Rule's lim-
its.° The law encourages non-fraudulent. gathering and analysis of
information; thus, the Chief justice argued, courts should not invoke
the saute policy concerns to protect those who obtain material, non-
public information through fraudulent means. 6 t Mr. Chiarella's actions
were fraudulent because he misappropriated the acquiring company's
confidential information, without the acquiring company's permission
and in violation of his fiduciary duty to his employer, the printer.02 By
using the misappropriated information to reap profits in the securities
markets, the Chief Justice argued, Mr. Chiarella violated Rule 101-5.°
Three years later, in 1983, the United States Supreme Court revis-
ited the parameters of liability under Rule 10b-5 in Dirks a SEC" In
Dirks, the Court overturned a conviction in an SEC proceeding against
a broker who obtained information about fraud at a corporation and
subsequently shared that infbrmation with investors, who traded in
reliance on that information before it became public.° The Court
reaffirmed its holding in Chiarella that there is no general duty for a
person in possession of material, nonpublic information about a cor-
poration to disclose the information before trading in the corpora-
tion's securities .w Citing Chiarella, the Court in Dirks ruled that a duty
to disclose material, nonpublic information arises only where fltilure
to do so would breach a duty that exists apart from the securities laws.°
The defendant, Raymond Dirks, was an officer in a brokerage
firm." Mr. Dirks received information about alleged fraud at Equity
Funding of America ("Equity") from an Equity employee.° Mr. Dirks
58 See id. at 240.
59
 See id.
° See id.
6 ' See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
62 See id. at 245.
63 See id. at 240.
61 463 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1983).
65 See id. at 648, 667.
66 See id. at 654.
67 See id.
68 See id. at 648.
See Ohio, 463 U.S. at 649.
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investigated and verified the validity of the allegations." Mr. Dirks
called a Wall Street Journal reporter and urged him to write a story
about the allegations, but the reporter declined to pursue the story. 71
During the course of his investigation, Mr. Dirks informed his firm's
clients and other investors about the problems at Equity. 72 As a result,
many Equity stockholders sold their interests in the corporation, and
the price of Equity stock fell precipitously." In response, the New York
Stock Exchange halted trading. 74 Federal and state investigations of
Equity resulted in many criminal indictments."
In addition, the SEC investigated Mr. Dirks's role in bringing the
fraud at Equity to light." In administrative proceedings, Mr. Dirks was
found guilty of aiding and abetting violations of federal securities laws,
including Rule 101)-5.77 The SEC reasoned that "tippees" incur an
obligation to "disclose or abstain" when they knowingly receive mate-
rial, nonpublic information from corporate insiders: 78 The SEC cen-
sured Mr. Dirks but declined to impose more severe punishment, citing
Mr. Dirk's role in exposing the fraud at Equity." Nevertheless, Mr. Dirks
appealed the SEC's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, a divided panel that affirmed the SEC's
judgment.'"
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Dirks by reaffirming its
holding in Chiarella that there is no general duty to "disclose or ab-
stain."81 Therefore, unless Mr. Dirks had a specific duty to disclose the
nonpublic information, he did not violate Rule 1 Ob-5. 82 The SEC ar-
gued that Mr. Dirks assumed such a duty when he knowingly received
information from Equity insiders, whO certainly could not have traded
on the nonpublic information that they provided to Mr. Dirks."
Rejecting the SEC's argument, the Court asserted that Equity
employees who provided Mr. Dirks with nonpublic information had
7° See id.
71 See id. at 649-50.
72 See id. at 640.
73 See id. at 649,650.
74 See Dides, 463 U.S. at 650.
75 See id. at 650 & n.4. It was only after these investigations began to hear fruit that the Wall
Street Journal published a story on the affair its account was based largely on information that
Mr. Dirks supplied. See id. at 650.
7° See id. at 650.
77 See id. at 650-51.
78 See id. at 651.
79 See Dide.s, 463 U.S. at 655-56.
8° See id. at 652.
81 See id. at 654.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 655-56.
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not violated their fiduciary duty to Equity." The Court reasoned that
because the Equity employees violated no (fury to their employer, Mr.
Dirks had no duty to disclose that arose from those employees' duty
to Equity." Furthermore, Mr. Dirks had no independent duty to Eq-
uity.8" Thus, the Court concluded that Mr. Dirks did not violate Rule
1013-5, and the Court overturned the lower court's judgment.
Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Dirks, the Second Circuit
continued to apply the misappropriation theory. 87
 By so doing, the
Second Circuit accepted the Supreme Court's determination that
breach of a specific duty was a necessary element of liability under Rule
101)-5, but held that Rule 1013-5 did not require the party aggrieved by
the breach of duty to be a party to the securities transaction that
consummated the fraud." The Seventh and Ninth Circuits followed
the Second Circuit in endorsing the misappropriation theory. 89
In 1995, in United States v. Bryan, the Fourth Circuit became the
first federal appellate court to reject the misappropriation theory.'"
The court held that the misappropriation theory failed to satisfy the
requirement that the actor's fraud occur "in connection with the pur-
chase or sale" of securities.•' Unlike the courts that embraced the
misappropriation theory, the Fourth Circuit rejected the notion that a
violation of Rule 1013-5 could be established by proving fraud, a secu-
rities transaction and a necessary connection between the two. 92 In-
stead, the court read Rule 1013-5 as imposing one "single indivisible
requirement" for liability.• The court held that misappropriation of
material, nonpublic information, followed by the use of that informa-
tion in a securities transaction, did not satisfy that unitary require-
inent."
In Bryan, the government charged the defendant, Elton Bryan,
with mail fraud, wire fraud and perjury, in addition to violation of Rule
84 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656, 666.
95 See id. at 667.
99 See id.
87 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, but it deadlocked on the misappropriation issue. See Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987). Thus, the validity of the misappropriation theory remained
unsettled.
" See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026, 1031.
flu See SEC v. Chesil, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2(1 . 439, 453 (9th
Cir. 1990).
9° See 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995).
91 See id. at 950 (quoting Rule 10b-5).
92 See id.
93 See id.
9-I See id.
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1011-5.'5 All the charges arose from Mr. Bryan's actions during his
tenure as director of West Virginia's state lottery.'"' A jury found him
guilty of violating Rule 10b-5 because he profited from securities trans-
actions that he made based on material, nonpublic information that
was entrusted to him in the course of his employment.°7
Throughout its opinion, the Fourth Circuit emphasized the lan-
guage of section 10(b), which requires "manipulation" or "decep-
tion."1'8 Acknowledging that "manipulation" is a "term of art" in the
securities field and that the term had no bearing in the instant case,
the court focused on the deception requirement.•" A deceptive act in
this context, the court reasoned, could take two forms: (1) material
misstatement of fact, or (2) breach of a duty to disclose."
The opinion presents no facts suggesting that a deceptive act of
the first sort took place." Although the court acknowledged that Mr.
Bryan's use of opportunities obtained in the course of his employment
constituted a breach of his duty to his employer, it rejected the notion
that. such a breach falls within the purview of Rule 101)-5. 1 °2 Citing
Supreme Court precedent, the Fourth Circuit concluded that "decep-
tion" within the meaning of section 10(b) applied only to deception
of buyers, sellers, investors and other parties with a similar interest in
a given securities transaction."'" Any other reading, the court main-
tained, would render the language "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security" meaningless. 1 °4
The Court elaborated on its decision that the misappropriation
theory did not supply the required nexus between a deceptive act and
a securities transaction. 115 The court viewed the misappropriation the-
ory as an unacceptable effort to create a general duty to forgo trans-
actions informed by material, nonpublic information." )° The Fourth
Circuit also expressed concerns that adoption of the misappropriation
9' See Bryan, 58 1.3d at 936.
• 6 See id. at 936, 937.
97 See id. at 936.
118 See id. at 915.
99 See id. at 915-46. The element of deception required I die underlying statute does no t
seem to abridge the scope or Rule 101)-5, which requires fraud. See supra note 24 and accompa-
nying text.
Inu See Bryan, 58 17.3d al 916.
111 See generally id.
102 See id. at 915, 950.
"See id. at 946.
1114 See id.
1115 See Bryan, 58 17.3d at 95I.
104; See id.
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theory inevitably would result in a federal common law regulating
fiduciary relationships.""
In Bryan, the Fourth Circuit collapsed the elements of a Rule
101)-5 violation into a "single indivisible requirement."'m Once it had
done so, its rejection of the misappropriation theory necessarily fol-
lowed." The act of misappropriating nonpublic information is inde-
pendent of the securities transaction in which that information is used
for the personal benefit of the trade0° Thus, by reading Rule 10b-5
and section 10(b) as dictating a "single indivisible requirement" for
liability, the court begged the question of the misappropriation the-
ory's validity."'
II. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: UNITED STATES V. 07IAGAN
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Bryan ignited a controversy over
the misappropriation theory in the criminal context, and a mini-explo-
sion of scholarship on the issue ensued.''' The controversy heightened
further when the Eighth Circuit followed the Fourth Circuit's lead in
rejecting the misappropriation theory."' In order to resolve the grow-
ing circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
Eighth Circuit's decision.' 14 .
In 1997, in United States v. O'Hagan, the Supreme Court endorsed
the misappropriation theory in the criminal context." 5 By doing so,
the Court reinstated convictions of James O'Hagan, an attorney who
had traded in securities with knowledge of material, nonpublic infor-
mation that he had misappropriated from one of his law firm's corpo-
rate clients.' 1 a The Court ruled that: (I) Mr. O'Hagan's breach. of his
fiduciary duty to his law firm and its client constituted fraud; and
(2) the fraud occurred "in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities."17
'° 7 See id. at 951-52.
1 °8 See N. at 950.
I" See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950.
II° See. id. at 944.
111 See id. at 950.
112
 See, e.g., Bayne, supra note 13, at 637 (arguing against the misappropriation theory's
validity); Rosenbloom, supra note 13, at 867 (arguing in favor of the theory's validity).
11 See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 617 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
t14 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 1087 (1997).
115
 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997).
116 See id. at 678. The.Court also reinstated Mr. 011agan's convictions under Exchange Act
Rule 14e-3(a) and the federal mail fraud laws. See id. at 677, 678. Because the Eighth Circuit had
not reached all the issues that Mr. O'Hagan had raised on appeal, the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the Eighth Circuit for further proceedings. See id. at 678.
117 See id. at 653. justice Ginsberg wrote the opinion for the Court.
May 1999]	 CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER RULE 1013-5 	 839
Citing Chiarella, the Court asserted that the element of fraud in a
violation of Rule 1 Ob-5 required breach of a duty existing apart from
federal securities law, 118 In this case, Mr. O'Hagan clearly had breached
fiduciary duties to both his law firm and its client. 119 Even the dissent-
ing Justices acknowledged that Mr. O'Hagan's conduct constituted
fraud within the meaning of Rule 1 Ob-5. 12°
The Court next addressed the requirement that the fraud be
committed "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. "121
The Court reasoned that Mr. O'Hagan's fraud was consummated not
when he obtained the confidential infbrmation, but when he used that
information for personal profit in the context or a securities transac-
tion.' 22 Acknowledging that there are other conceivable uses for non-
public information of the type that Mr. 0' Hagan misappropriated, the
Court made the common-sense assumption that most people would
Find such information valuable only in the context of its use in the
securities markets,'" The Court distinguished the facts of -O'Hagan
from a hypothetical situation where a person embezzled money, then
used the ill-gotten funds to purchase securities. 124 Such a scheme would
not fall within Rule I Ob-5's prohibitions, the Court reasoned, because
the fraud is complete when the money is obtained; the securities
transaction is not an integral part of the fraud, as it is in a case involving
misappropriated nonpublic information. 125
Having established that Rule 101)-5 encompasses the misappro-
priation theory, the Court justified its interpretation of the Ride
light of the policies underlying the federal securities laws. 126 The Court
asserted that informational advantages obtained scurrilously could un-
dermine investor confidence in securities markets.' 27 Some actors
might forgo securities investments altogether; others might incur ine-
4 t 8 Se id. at 161	 R(C iting ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 390, 395 (1958)). 
D9See
120 See O'Hagan, 521 U,S. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("the Court's interpretation of .
Rule 1013-5 would he entirely reasonable in some other context"); 521 U.S. at 689 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("nondisclosure where there is a Inv-existing ditty to disclose satisfies our definitions
or fraud and deceit for purposes of the securities laws.").
121 See id. al 655-56 (quoting Rule 101)-5).
122 See id. at 656.
121
	 id. at 657. This is perhaps a charitable characterization of the Court's fractured
reasoning. Tile Court would have done better to stress that it was only Mr. Cr Hagan's unauthor-
ized use of the misappropriated nifbrination that violated his ditties to his law firm and its client.
In this sense, 07/agan is an easy case: it would be harder to argue that Rule 101)-5 was applicable
where 11011Public information wars acquired in a fraudulent way.
124 See id. at 656-57.
125 See 011agan, 521 U.S. at ('s56.-57.
126 See id. ai 658-59.
127 See id. at 058.
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leient costs in an effort to avoid dealing with unscrupulous hives-
tors.I 28 If the law is to prevent these deleterious effects, the Court
reasoned, it makes no sense to distinguish between traditional insiders
and misappropriators of material, nonpublic information.' 29 The lan-
guage of Rule 1 Ob-5 and section 10(b) is amenable to a broad inter-
pretation, the Court reasoned, and the Court determined that policy
considerations favored a broad reading in this case.""
Despite its endorsement of the broad policy concerns underlying
Rule 1 Ob-5, the Court ultimately adopted a narrower conception of the
misappropriation theory in O'Hagan than Chief Justice Burger had
advocated in his dissenting opinion in Chiarella." 1 Whereas Chief Jus-
tice Burger's theory would have required possessors of misappropri-
ated, material, nonpublic information to disclose that information to
other parties in a securities transaction, the theory adopted by the
Court in O'Hagan only requires the actor to disclose his or her inten-
tions to the source of the information. 132 The Court acknowledges that
the trader's disclosure of his intentions to the source of the material,
nonpublic information does little to advance the policy goals of Rule
Ob-5,'" Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the language of Rule
101)-5 requires this result."' Where the trader has made full disclosure
to the source of the information, there has been no breach of the
trader's duty to the source of the information, and thus there can be
no liability under Rule 10b-5.' 35
128 See id. at 659.
129 See id. The Court does not consider the argument that the victims of traditional insiders
have a right to expect those insiders to deal fairly with them because the parties have a fiduciary
relationship. As Justice Cardozo famously said, "Iiilany forms of conduct permissible in a
workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties."
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Traditionally, the law has not imposed duties
of upon parties to a discrete transaction, who presumably are "acting at arm's length." See
id. Although the arguments in favor of interpreting the securities law to create such a duty are
strong, it would hardly have been unprecedented or illogical for the Court to reach the contrary
conclusion, particularly in light of the Court's prior, repeated insistence that Rule 106-5 penalizes
only violations of duties that exist apart from federal securities law. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 654 (1983).
1 ",See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 659.
1 :" See id. at 655 n.6. ("The Government does not propose that we adopt a misappropriation
theory of that breadth."): Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (Burger, GI, dissenting).
I " See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 n.6; Chinrella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
1119 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 659 11.9 ("[S]uch conduct may affect the securities markets in
the saute manner as the conduct reached by the misappropriation theory. [Nevertheless,] the
fact that § 10(b) is only a partial antidote ... does not call into question its prohibition of conduct
that falls within its textual proscription.").
134 See id.
"5
 See id. at 656.
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Justice Scalia dissented from , the Court's reinstatement of Mr.
O'Hagan's convictions under Rule 10b-5. 136 In a brief opinion, Justice
Scalia acknowledged that the majority's interpretation of Rule 10b-5
was reasonable.'• 7 He argued, however, that the majority's expansive
reading was not appropriate in a criminal case like O'Hagan.r'8 Iii light
of the general principle that courts should construe ambiguity in
criminal statutes in favor of lenity, Justice Scalia argued that the Court
should have construed the language "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security" to require fraud on a party to a securities
transaction.'"
justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, also dis-
sented."" justice Thomas agreed with the Court's determination that
Mr. O'Hagan's actions constituted fraud within the meaning of Rule
10b-5. 141 Justice Thomas disagreed, however, with the Court's ruling
that the fraud occurred "in connection with the purchase or sale" of
securities. 142 He argued that the government's version of the misappro-
priation theory was unworkable, and that the Court had improperly
substituted its own version of the misappropriation theory in place of
the government's proffered theory."'
Justice ThoMas attacked the majority's distinction between the use
of misappropriated information in a securities transaction, which is a
violation of Rule 101)-5, and the use of misappropriated money in a
securities transaction, which is not a violation."' He rejected the ma-
jority's assertion that the fraud in the latter case is complete when the
wrongdoer obtains the money, but the fraud in the former case is
consummated only when the wrongdoer uses the information in a
securities transaction. 145 He argued that information, like money, has
many potential uses. 146 Thus, justice Thomas argued, the tnisappropria-
111 Ser ,id. at 679 (Scalia, J,, dissenting).
t37 See id.
1 " See O'Hagan, 521 U.S: at 679.
1119 See id.
1411 See id. at 680-701 (ThOinas, J., dissenting). Many powerful arguments can be made against
the validity of the misappropriation theory. See, e.g., id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting); United
States v. - Bryan, 58 1 7.3(1 933 (4th Cir. 1995). UnfOrtunately, Justice Thomas's dissent fails to do
justice to these arguments.
141 See O'Hagati, 521 U.S, at 680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
142 See id. (quoting Rule 10b-5).
143 See id. at 681, 687.
144 See id.
145'
	 id. at 681-83, 682-85 ("lW1herrthe majority seeks to distinguish the embezzlement of
funds from the embezzlement of information, it becomes clear that neither the [SEC] nor the
majority has a coherent theory
146
.See,071agazt, 521 U.S, at 685 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
842	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 {Vol. 40:829
for of material, nonpublic information has completed a fraud when
that information is obtained wrongfully."'
The majority conceded that the government overstated its argu-
ment when it stated that the misappropriator's "only" possible use for
material, nonpublic information is its use in a securities transaction."8
Justice Thomas seized on this admission by the majority.' 49 He accused
the majority of violating a basic principle of administrative law by
fashioning an alternative explanation for the SEC after rejecting the
SEC's own explanation.'" He also noted that the Court's determina-
tion that misappropriated nonpublic information is "ordinarily" only
valuable in the context of a securities transaction was unsupported by
factual findings. 15 '
III. CIVIL ACTIONS UNDER RULE 10B-5 AND THE MISAPPROPRIATION
THEORY
Section 10(h) and Rule 10b-5 are criminal enactments.' 52 Never-
theless, courts have long recognized a private cause of action for
persons who are harmed by violations of Rule 10b-5. 153 Because civil
actions under Rule 10b-5 further the goals of federal securities regula-
tion, such actions have been an important part of securities regulation
for many years.'"
1n 1946, in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that a
private cause of action exists under Rule 1013-5. 155 Although only a
district court opinion, Kardon today is acclaimed as a landmark case
in securities law. 1 " The court based its holding on the policies under-
lying tort law and the federal securities laws.' 57
147 See id. Justice Thomas does riot consider that the mere possession of nonpublic informa-
tion generally does not entail a breach of fiduciary duty.
145 See id. at 657.
I" See id. at 687 (Thomas; J., dissenting).
150 See id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983)).
151
 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 688.
152 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
I" See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Stipp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
154 See Blue Chip Stamps'v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
155 69 F. Stipp. at 514.
156 See id. Kardon has been cited in 11 different Supreme Court opinions. See Bhie Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730. It was well-settled that Rule 1013-5 created a private right of action by the
time the Supreme Court addressed the issue. See id.
157
 See Kardon, 69 F. Stipp. at 513, 514.
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The plaintiffs in Kardon alleged that the defendants persuaded
them to sell stock for considerably less than its true value. 158 The
plaintiffs alleged they sold the stock because of misrepresentations
made by the defendants. 159 The court accepted without discussion the
assertion that the alleged conduct, if proven in a criminal case, would
constitute a violation of Rule 19b-5. 16°
Although the defendants' alleged conduct undisputedly ran afoul
of Rule 10b-5, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs had no cause of
action based on that provision." In support of their argument, the de-
fendants noted that several other provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 expressly provided civil remedies for parties aggrieved by
violations of those provisions.'," 2 Because section 10(b) lacked such a
provision, the defendants argued, the court could infer that Congress
intended to deny parties like the plaintiffs a cause of action based on
section 10 (b) . 163
Although the court acknowledged that the defendants' argument
based on statutory construction was 'strong, it nonetheless rejected the
argument.'" Instead,. the court focused on the broad purpose of the
Exchange Act—regulation of securities transactions of all kinds. 11 i5 Rule
10b-5 condemns manipulative and deceptive practices in the securities
markets:1 'G The defendants' alleged conduct, if proven, clearly would
fall within the realm of activities condemned by Rule 10b-5. 1 °
Applying traditional principles ,of tort law, the court stated that a
private cause of action may be inferred from a criminal statute unless
the legislature explicitly forecloses- such a right.' 6' Neither the Ex-
change Act in general nor section 10(h) in particular, the court deter-
mined, expresses a clear congressional intent to foreclose private
causes of action.'" The court asserted that the violation of a statute
constittites a tort, and in light of the lack of language foreclosing a
158 See id. at 513.
19" See id.
1611
	 id. ("lt	 . cannoi be questioned that the complaint sets forth conduct . 	 directly in
violation of the provisions of (Rule 105-5].").
161 See id,
162 See. Kardoa, 69 F. Stipp. at 514.
169 See id.
1114 see id.
fur,
	 id.
166 See id.
167 See Kardon, 69 F. Sapp. at 513.
168 See id. at 513-14.
169 See id. at 514.
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private cause of action under Rule 10b-5, the court allowed the plain-
tiffs' action to proceed.""
The court in Kardon relied on a wide range of policies to support
its holding that a plaintiff could maintain a civil suit based on conduct
violative of Rule 10b-5. 17 ' First, the violation of a criminal statute gen-
erally is considered a tort. 172 Therefore, parties who are victimized by
criminal activity may maintain a suit for damages against the -wrong-
doer,. unless such a right is explicitly denied by the legislature."' Sec-
ond, the.purpose of Rule 10b-5 is the proscription of manipulative and
deceptive practices in securities markets."4 By permitting private ac-
tions based on violations of Rule 10b-5, the courts assist the SEC in
effectuating Congress's goals under the Exchange Act. 15 Lastly, Con-
gress enacted federal securities laws for the benefit of investors." 6
Recognizing a private cause of action furthers the interests of investors
by allowing investors that are harmed by violations of Rule 10b-5 to
seek judicial redress of their injuries.'"
In 1983, in Moss - v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., the Second Circuit held
that the misappropriation theory may not Serve as the basis for a
lawsuit under Rule 100-5 by a party to whom the misappropriator owes
no duty apart from the securities laws. 1 i8 The court's analysis in Moss
focused on the lack of any specific duty owed by the defendants to the
plaintiffs."' The court reasoned that because no such duty existed, the
plaintiffs had no cause of action against the defendants, even though
the plaintiffs alleged that they were injured by the defendants' illegal
activities.'"
Moss was a class-action suit, brought on behalf of all shareholders
who sold stock in a company just before a tender offer was made for
that company's stock.' 8 ' The defendants in Moss were an investment
banking firm and several of its fiduciaries.' 82 Two of the individual
120 See id. at 513,514.
171 See id. at 513-14.
172 See Kardon, 69 F. Sapp. at 513.
173 See id. at 514.
171 See id.
175 See id.
176
 See id.
177
 See Kardon., 69 F. Stipp. at 513.
1713 719 F.2d 5,16 (2d Cir. 1983).
179 See id.
. 136 See id. at 13 ("RI he district court was correct in concluding that 'plaintiff cannot hope
to piggyback upon the ditty owed by defendants .	 .'").
181 See id. at 8.
182 See id. at 8-9.
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defendants had received criminal convictions under the misappropria-
tion theory of Rule 101)-5 for the conduct at issue in Moss.'"
The Second Circuit considered and rejected three possible
sources from which the defendants in Moss could be said to owe a duty
to the class of plaintiffs.'"' Most significantly, the court held that the
defendants' admittedly criminal conduct did not expose them to civil
liability for injuries caused by their criminal acts, except to the extent
that the defendants had sonic pre-existing duty to those parties:" The
court also rejected arguments that the defendants actually were insid-
ers of the target corporation: 8 G
The existence of a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 has
been settled for many years now: 87 Nevertheless, Moss remains the only
appellate-level case involving the validity of the misappropriation the-
ory in the civil context. The Supreme Court's opinion in O'Hagan did
not address the issue: 88
IV. ANALYSIS: EXPANDING THE LAW TO PROMOTE JUSTICE
A. Into the Abyss: Scrutinizing the Logic of O'Hagau
In OThigan, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the misap-
propriation theory:"• An abundance of case law on the misappropria-
tion theory had developed in lower courts during the seventeen years
after Chiarella, but neither the majority nor the dissenters made much
use of this body of case law in their opinions in O'Hagan." ) Instead,
the O'Hagan opinions rely primarily on novel arguments, supported
by snippets of reasoning from prior Supreme Court cases that pre-
sented issues quite different from the issues in O'llagan."
1" See Moss, 719 F.2d at 9 11.6.
rah See id, at 13-15.
185 See id. at. 13.
186
 See id. at 13-14. Of course, if the defendants were naditional insiders, the plaintiffs would
have had a cause of action. See. Kaidon, 69 F. Supp. at 514.
1187 See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730.
188 See generally O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642.
189 See id. at 650.
The Cour't's only metnion of these lower-court decisions comes in a footnote in the
majority opinion. See id, at 650 1).3 (citing United Stales v. Cheslinan, 947 E2c1 551, 566 (2c1 Cir.
1991); SEC v. Cherif, 933 E211 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 E2d 439, 453 (9th Cir.
1990)). The Court also virtually ignores Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987), where
the Court deadlocked on the issue of the misappropriation theory's validity.
191 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656-57 (distinguishing misappropriation of information from
theft of money): id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that principle of lenity in interpretation
of criminal statutes forecloses enforcement of misappropriation theory in the criminal context);
id. at 687 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs, Ass'n v. State Farm Mitt. Auto. his.
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One of the most striking aspects of the majority opinion in O'Ha-
gan is the nonchalance with which the Court dismissed language from
its opinion in Chiarella. 192 The Court correctly notes that Chiarella
expressly leaves open the question of the misappropriation theory's
validity.'"3 When the Eighth Circuit rejected the misappropriation the-
ory, however, that court was influenced by the Supreme Court's state-
ment in Chiarella that liability under Rule 1 Ob-5 "is premised upon a
duty to disclose arising from a• relationship of trust and confidence
between parties to a transaction."' 94 The Supreme Court disavowed any
intention to reject this language, instead maintaining that these state-
ments were intended merely to "[reject] the notion that section 10(b)
stretches so far as to impose a general duty between ail participants in
market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic
information."'"5 Although the Court ignores the issue, its decision in
O'Hagan effectively limits . Chiarella to this narrow holding.' 96
Like die majority opinion, Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion
attempts to break new ground.' 97 The government maintained at oral
argument that use of misappropriated information in a securities trans-
action violates Rule 1 Ob-5, whereas use of misappropriated money in
a securities transaction does not violate the Rule.'" Justice Thomas
argued that there is no difference, for purposes of the securities laws,
between misappropriation of information and misappropriation of
money for use in securities transactions.' 99 Justice Thomas's argument,
however, is misplaced; Mr. O'Hagan probably did not commit a fraud
against his law firm and its client merely by obtaining the informa-
tio11. 2'"' Rather, the fraud occurred only when he used the information
in the securities markets, thereby "misappropriating" it for his own
use.201
 However typical or atypical the facts of O'Hagan may have been,
the case was easily distinguishable from a hypothetical case involving
the use of misappropriated money in a securities transaction. 2"
Co., 463 U.S. 129, 143 (1983)) (arguing that misappropriation theory cannot be applied against
Mr. O'llagan because the SEC's explanation of theory to the Court was flawed).
102 See id. at 662.
no3
 See id.
'' See United States v. O'llagan, 92 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1996), rev d, 521 U.S. 642 (1997)
(quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (emphasis added)).
' 95
 See °Hagan, 521 U.S. at 662.
19" See id.
197 See id. at 681-85, 687 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
I" See id. at 683-84 (citing the transcript from oral argument).
19° See id. at 686.
"See 07Iagart, 521 U.S. at 647-48, 648 n.1.
2° 1 See id. at 656.
'212 See id. at 681-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The majority's modification of the government's version of the
misappropriation theory evokes the most heated criticism in justice
Thomas's dissent. 2° He argued that the majority must accept or reject
the SEC's version of the misappropriation theory in toto.204
 The Case
upon which he relied—Motor Vehicle Manufactors Association v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.—however, has little relevance to
O'Hagan. 215 Stale Farm involved a challenge to an agency's rulemaking
process; in O'Hagan, no one contested the validity of Rule 10b-5. 2""
Furthermore, the Court's insistence on sound agency reasoning in
State Farm was sensible, given the great deference that courts give to
agency action in such circturistances. 207 In his dissent in O'Hagan,
Justice Scalia correctly criticized Justice Thomas for failing to distin-
guish cases where agency action receives "Chevron deference" from
cases like O'Hagan, where agency reasoning has no more legal sig-
nificance than any other argument Made by a party during litigation.218
B. Expanding the Misappropriation Theory to Promote Consistent Justice
In light of the policies favoring private actions under Rule 10b-5,
the right to bring such actions should extend to investors who are
victimized by persons who trade on the basis of misappropriated,
material, nonpublic information. 200 This is especially so now that O'Ha-
gan has settled the validity of the misappropriation theory in the
criminal context. 21 t' Recognizing such a right of action is consistent with
the principle that the violation of athe statute is a tort.21 Courts
should compel those. who violate the law to compensate the victims of
their unlawful activity.
'-'01 See id. at 687.
2'4
	 id.
21111 See generally OTIagan, 521 U.S. 642; State Farm, 463 U.S. at 39. In State Farm, the. Court
held that rescission of a regulation by the Department of Transportation was arbitrary and
capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 39.
Although conceding that a reasonable explanation for the agency's action could be formulated,
the Court refused to supply a reasoned basis for the agency's decision that the agency itself had
failed to supply. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 39.
2°7 See id. at 43.
211'S See 011agan, 521 U.S. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,843-44 (1984) (ruling that courts must give an agency's interpre-
tation of a statute controlling weight, unless that interpretation is manifestly contrary to congres-
sional intent). Chevron involved a challenge to the validity of an EPA regulation promulgated
pursuant to the Clean Air Act. See 467 U.S. at 840-41.
2°9 See 071agan, 521 U.S. at 658-59 (detailikg policy considerations behind section. 10(b)
and Rule 101)-5); Kardcm v. National Gypsum Ca,, 69 F. Supp. 512,513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
2111 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650.
211 See kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 513.
? 12 See id.
212 Such 'an obligation furthers the purposes of
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the securities laws which, post-O'Hagan, clearly proscribe the misap-
propriation of material, nonpublic information for use in securities
transactiOns. 21 ;1 Furthermore, imposing such a duty would protect the
investing public, which is ultimately the intended beneficiary of the
securities laws. 2 "
The policy considerations cited in Kardon favor the allowance of
civil actions based on the misappropriation theory of Rule 10b-5 liabil-
ity:21 ' First, because the violation of a criminal statute is a tort, parties
who are victimized by such a violation should be allowed to maintain
a suit for damages against the wrongdoer, unless the legislature spe-
cifically forecloses such a right. 21" Second, the purpose of Rule 10b-5
is the proscription of manipulative and deceptive practices in securities
markets:2 ' 7 By permitting private actions based on both the traditional
and misappropriation theories of Rule 1013-5, the courts would assist
the SEC to the greatest- extent possible in effectuating Congress's
intentions. 218 Lastly, Congress enacted federal securities laws for the
benefit of investors. 215 Allowing a private right of action for damages
caused by Rule 10b-5 "misappropriation" would further the interests
of investors by allowing them to seek judicial redress for injuries caused
by criminal conduct. 22t'
Failure to extend the misappropriation theory to the civil context
would frustrate the policy objectives favoring civil actions under Rule
1 Ob-5. 22 ' The general policy of tort law favoring private rights of action
for statutory violations would be compromised needlessly. 222 Failure to
extend the misappropriation theory to the civil context also would
compromise the central purpose of Rule 10b-5—the prevention of
manipulative and deceptive practices in the securities markets. 223 Civil
actions complement enforcement actions by the SEC and the Justice
Department, thereby expanding the reach and enhancing the effec-
tiveness of 1O -5. 2240
213 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650.
214 See Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514.
215 See id. at 513-14.
2111
 See id.
117 See id at 514.
218 See id.
219 See Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514.
229 See id. at 513.
221 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S..at 658-59; Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 513-14.
222 See Kardon, 69 F. Stipp. at 514,
22:1 See id.
224 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,730 (1975).
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Few lawsuits have been brought to date under the misappropria-
tion theory of Rule 1 Ob-5, perhaps due to the courts' unwillingness in
recent years to entertain novel private causes of action under Rule
01)-5.225 Nevertheless, there is no principled distinction between tradi-
tional insiders and misappropriators of nonpublic information. 22"
Courts that focus on the absence of duty owed by a misappropriator
to actors in the securities markets essentially require the plaintiff to
prove the common law elements of fraud:2n By doing so, these courts
effectively nullify the benefits of allowing private causes of action under
Rule 1 Ob-5, because aggrieved persons are not afforded any rights
under the Rule that were not previously afibrded to them under state
law.225
The arguments against the misappropriation theory in the crimi-
nal context are not without merit. 22n Nevertheless, Oliagan has re-
solved this controversy in favor of the misappropriation theory's valid-
ity:2 '3" In light of this reality, there is no good reason to distinguish
between misappropriators and traditional insiders, thereby denying
the victims of the former the right to seek restitution under Rule
MATTHEW A. AUFMAN
225 See, e.g., Blue. Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723 (establishing limits on private causes of action
under Rule 10b-5).
22" See 011agan, 521 U.S. at 659 ("It makes scant sense to hold a lawyer like 011agan a
§ 10(b) violator if' he [misappropriates nonpublic information], but not if he works for a law firm
[representing the company, thereby making him an insider'I. The text of the statute requires no
such result.").
227 See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F,2d 5, 16 (2d Cir. 1983).
228 See Kartion, 69 F. Stipp. at 513.
22(1 See, e.g., 011agan, 521 U.S. at 679 (Scalia,,]., dissenting); United States v. Brrui, 58 F.3c1
933, 950 (4th Cir. 1995); see generally Bayne, supra note 13.
23(1 See ClIagan, 521 U.S. at 650.
24" See id.
